Declassified Key Judgments of the National
Intelligence Estimate “Trends in Global Terrorism:
Implications for the United States” dated April 2006
Key Judgments
United States-led counterterrorism efforts
have seriously damaged the leadership of
al-Qa’ida and disrupted its operations; however, we judge that
al-Qa’ida will continue to
pose the greatest threat to the Homeland and US interests abroad by a single
terrorist
organization. We also assess that the global jihadist movement—which
includes al-
Qa’ida, affiliated and independent terrorist groups, and emerging networks
and cells—is
spreading and adapting to counterterrorism efforts.
• Although we cannot measure
the extent of the spread with precision, a large body
of all-source reporting indicates that activists identifying themselves as
jihadists,
although a small percentage of Muslims, are increasing in both number
and
geographic dispersion.
• If this trend continues,
threats to US interests at home and abroad will become
more diverse, leading to increasing attacks worldwide.
• Greater pluralism and more
responsive political systems in Muslim majority
nations would alleviate some of the grievances jihadists exploit. Over time,
such
progress, together with sustained, multifaceted programs targeting
the
vulnerabilities of the jihadist movement and continued pressure on
al-Qa’ida,
could erode support for the jihadists.
We
assess that the global jihadist movement is decentralized, lacks a coherent global
strategy, and is becoming more diffuse. New jihadist networks and cells, with
anti-
American agendas, are increasingly likely to emerge. The confluence of shared
purpose
and dispersed actors will make it harder to find and undermine jihadist
groups.
• We assess that the
operational threat from self-radicalized cells will grow in
importance to US counterterrorism efforts, particularly abroad but also in
the
Homeland.
• The jihadists regard Europe
as an important venue for attacking Western interests.
Extremist networks inside the extensive Muslim diasporas in Europe
facilitate
recruitment and staging for urban attacks, as illustrated by the 2004 Madrid
and
2005 London bombings.
We assess that the
Iraq jihad is shaping a new generation of terrorist leaders and
operatives; perceived jihadist success there would inspire more fighters to
continue the
struggle elsewhere.
• The Iraq conflict has become
the “cause celebre” for jihadists, breeding a deep
resentment of US involvement in the Muslim world and cultivating supporters
for
the global jihadist movement. Should jihadists leaving Iraq perceive
themselves,
and be perceived, to have failed, we judge fewer fighters will be inspired to
carry
on the fight.
We assess that the underlying
factors fueling the spread of the movement outweigh its
vulnerabilities and are likely to do so for the duration of the timeframe of this
Estimate.
• Four underlying factors are
fueling the spread of the jihadist movement:
(1) Entrenched grievances, such as corruption,
injustice, and fear of Western
domination, leading to anger, humiliation, and a sense of powerlessness;
(2) the Iraq “jihad;”
(3) the slow pace of real and sustained economic, social,
and
political reforms in many Muslim majority nations; and
(4) pervasive anti-US sentiment among most
Muslims—all of which jihadists exploit.
Concomitant vulnerabilities in the jihadist movement have emerged that, if fully
exposed
and exploited, could begin to slow the spread of the movement. They
include
dependence on the continuation of Muslim-related conflicts, the limited appeal of
the
jihadists’ radical ideology, the emergence of respected voices of
moderation, and
criticism of the violent tactics employed against mostly Muslim citizens.
• The jihadists’
greatest vulnerability is that their ultimate political solution—an
ultra-conservative interpretation of shari’a-based governance spanning
the
Muslim world—is unpopular with the vast majority of Muslims. Exposing
the
religious and political straitjacket that is implied by the jihadists’
propaganda
would help to divide them from the audiences they seek to persuade.
• Recent condemnations of
violence and extremist religious interpretations by a few
notable Muslim clerics signal a trend that could facilitate the growth of
a
constructive alternative to jihadist ideology: peaceful political activism. This
also
could lead to the consistent and dynamic participation of broader
Muslim
communities in rejecting violence, reducing the ability of radicals to capitalize
on
passive community support. In this way, the Muslim mainstream emerges as
the
most powerful weapon in the war on terror.
• Countering the spread of the
jihadist movement will require coordinated
multilateral efforts that go well beyond operations to capture or kill
terrorist
leaders.
If democratic reform efforts in
Muslim majority nations progress over the next five years,
political participation probably would drive a wedge between intransigent
extremists and
groups willing to use the political process to achieve their local objectives.
Nonetheless,
attendant reforms and potentially destabilizing transitions will create new
opportunities
for jihadists to exploit.
Al-Qa’ida,
now merged with Abu Mus’ab al-Zarqawi’s network, is exploiting the
situation in Iraq to attract new recruits and donors and to maintain its
leadership role.
• The loss of key leaders,
particularly Usama Bin Ladin, Ayman al-Zawahiri, and
al-Zarqawi, in rapid succession, probably would cause the group to fracture
into
smaller groups. Although like-minded individuals would endeavor to carry on
the
mission, the loss of these key leaders would exacerbate strains and
disagreements.
We assess that the resulting splinter groups would, at least for a time, pose a
less
serious threat to US interests than does al-Qa’ida.
• Should al-Zarqawi continue
to evade capture and scale back attacks against
Muslims, we assess he could broaden his popular appeal and present a
global
threat.
• The increased role of Iraqis
in managing the operations of al-Qa’ida in Iraq might
lead veteran foreign jihadists to focus their efforts on external
operations.
Other affiliated Sunni extremist organizations, such as Jemaah Islamiya, Ansar
al-
Sunnah, and several North African groups, unless countered, are likely to expand
their
reach and become more capable of multiple and/or mass-casualty attacks outside
their
traditional areas of operation.
• We assess that such groups
pose less of a danger to the Homeland than does al-
Qa’ida but will pose varying degrees of threat to our allies and to US
interests
abroad. The focus of their attacks is likely to ebb and flow between local
regime
targets and regional or global ones.
We judge that most jihadist groups—both well-known
and newly formed—will use
improvised explosive devices and suicide attacks focused primarily on soft targets
to
implement their asymmetric warfare strategy, and that they will attempt to
conduct
sustained terrorist attacks in urban environments. Fighters with experience in
Iraq are a
potential source of leadership for jihadists pursuing these tactics.
• CBRN capabilities will
continue to be sought by jihadist groups.
While Iran, and to a lesser
extent Syria, remain the most active state sponsors of
terrorism, many other states will be unable to prevent territory or resources from
being
exploited by terrorists.
Anti-US and
anti-globalization sentiment is on the rise and fueling other radical
ideologies. This could prompt some leftist, nationalist, or separatist groups to
adopt
terrorist methods to attack US interests. The radicalization process is occurring
more
quickly, more widely, and more anonymously in the Internet age, raising the
likelihood of
surprise attacks by unknown groups whose members and supporters may be difficult
to
pinpoint.
• We judge that groups of all
stripes will increasingly use the Internet to
communicate, propagandize, recruit, train, and obtain logistical and
financial
support.
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