just an FYI for what happened on sept of 2000
as bit about nukes and stuff too.
there was a LOT of discussion about missiles (high tech stuff) at that time.
including IRAN Russia, China etc...
also went into WMD (bio+chem)
other interesting stuff...

(mainly for research, looking for info on war-games? then see lionks at the bottom, or use the 9/11 search tool

DoD News Briefing
Mr. Kenneth H. Bacon, ASD PA
Tuesday, *September 12, 2000 *- 2:41 p.m.EDT
Q: There's a congressional staff report out that says that China's modernizing its military and
developing joint war-fighting faster than the Pentagon estimates. Would you agree with that assessment,
or do you have a different view?
Q: The Senate is debating an amendment to the China trade bill which would punish China for its weapons
proliferation activities. And a number of speakers, both Democrats and Republicans, have said that China
has not fulfilled its promises to curb its nuclear missile exports. Does the Pentagon have a view on whether
China has fulfilled its promises? I know that the secretary made an issue of the cruise missiles with China in
'98, I believe.
Bacon: Well, I would consider, one, China's promise not to export certain anti-ship cruise missiles to Iran;
that's an example. I would consider China's promise not to sell MTCR- -- missile technology control regime --
class ground-to-ground missiles, whole missiles, to other countries as a sign of progress
http://www.fas.org/news/china/2000/prc-000912.htm

11 September 2000
Text: *Senator Thompson* Ties Non-Proliferation Act to China PNTR
Thompson-Torricelli bill offered as amendment to H.R. 4444
the bill that would grant China Permanent Normal Trade Relations
(PNTR) status.
"Granting permanent normal trade status to China without addressing
their abysmal record of spreading weapons of mass destruction signals
to the world that we won't do anything that might offend our trading
partners -- even if it involves our national security," Thompson said
in a September 11 press release.

• Strategic response times are much shorter. The availability of news from cable, satellite, the internet, and other media compresses the time between finding out about events and the demand to "do something." The requirements for rapid-response capabilities are clear.

• We can expect more failed states, as people struggle for independence, for political legitimacy, and for economic and resource advantages in climates of violence, repression, and deprivation. We can also expect an increased role for non-state actors. Deterrence against these threats is difficult. Our ability to find peaceful alternatives to the use of force will be severely taxed.

• The availability of technologies to potential adversaries is expanding, to include missiles and unmanned aerial vehicles armed with conventional, chemical, biological, and other weapons. As deterrence and arms control become more problematic, we need to aggressively explore systems to defeat these threats.

• The range and types of conflict will expand. As the diversity of threats increases, so too will the complexity of military tasks. We can expect asymmetric attacks, anti-access strategies, and information warfare designed to take advantage of our perceived weaknesses and to prevent the United States from deploying forces. Future adversaries may also try to stay below the threshold of clear aggression, further complicating appropriate response options. When you combine these factors with the very real potential for high-intensity regional conflict, or even direct threats to our homeland, it is reasonable to conclude that our future joint force commanders will face some enormous challenges.

The focus of study and innovation during the interwar period was influenced primarily by the lessons of World War I, including mass mobilization for war, the avoidance of trench warfare, and the integration of emerging technologies such as the airplane and the tank.[3] Both the War and Navy Departments, aided by the students and faculties at the War and Naval Colleges, also studied possible future threats to America's security. They were especially concerned about Japanese threats to US possessions in the Pacific, to Southeast Asian natural resources, and to the vital shipping lanes in the Pacific. Beginning in 1923-24, presaging the Goldwater-Nichols era of joint emphasis, the Army and Navy War Colleges assisted the Joint Army-Navy Board during a continuous series of war games based on War Plan Orange, the contingency plan for war with Japan.

This led to further study and analysis by the future leaders of World War II as they contemplated inventive approaches to address potential threat scenarios. One of the most important examples of how leader development supports innovation was the Navy's emphasis on creating an effective aircraft carrier force that would extend the range and mobility of combat aviation. The Naval War College played a pivotal role in this effort.[4] Under the prescient leadership of Rear Admiral William S. Sims, the Naval War College conducted a series of strategic and tactical war games that underscored the immense potential of the aircraft carrier. Simultaneously, these games provided critical leader development for naval officers in the tactical decisionmaking process.[5]

The Marine Corps, driven by the requirement to provide bases to support naval movements across the Pacific Ocean, seized upon the idea of amphibious assault. Students at the Marine Staff College also played a vital role in the development of this important doctrine, conceived in the early 1920s by Major Earl Ellis. Despite its limited size and budget, the Marine Corps was able to experiment with amphibious operations in the mid-1920s and again from the late 1930s through the beginning of World War II.