Guest Researcher Nico Haupt
ewing2001, Wed Aug 10 2005, 06:05PM
http://team8plus.org/print.php?plugin:forum.800
Team8plus is aware of the political spin and
abuse of the recent mainstream reports about "Able Danger".
However, we are also aware, that most of the alleged 9/11 suspects
had INDEED been under observation.
In how far "Able Danger" played into these observation teams or not
(or is a carefully designed distraction), should be part of a fair
and honest investigation, and separated from the political spin of
"negligence" and "protection of Homeland".
To begin with, here are some articles, which might show us a little
bit more about how Curt Weldon could have been used as a propaganda
tool:
http://www.larouchepub.com/other/2005/3232vs_cheney_war.html
August 12, 2005 issue of Executive Intelligence Review.
"...In April 2005, Regnery Publishing, Inc. released another
fractured-fairy-tale propaganda piece, promoting pre-emptive war on
Iran, this one by Rep. Curt Weldon (R-Pa.).
Sources familiar with the book report that
Weldon was snookered by ex-CIA Director and leading neo-con war
party operative James Woolsey, and self-proclaimed "universal
fascist" Michael Ledeen, into buying fake intelligence, pushed
through a former Iranian minister under the Shah, who has more
recently been a business partner of discredited Iran-Contra gun
dealer Manucher Ghorbanifar.
Representative Weldon concealed the identity of his high-level
"source," referring to him only as "Ali." But "Ali" was soon
identified as Fereidoun Mahdavi, a former commerce minister, who
fled Iran shortly after the 1979 Islamic Revolution, and never
looked back...."
Reports: 9/11 clue hid in Tampa
http://www.sptimes.com/2005/08/10/Worldandnation/Reports__911_clue_hid.shtml
August 10, 2005
"... Weldon said a secret military unit known as "Able Danger"
discovered a year before the attacks that ringleader Mohammed Atta
and three other future hijackers were in the United States.
Weldon said the unit - created at SOCom under a classified
directive in 1999 to take out al-Qaida targets - identified Atta
and the others as likely members of the organization.
In fall 2000, the unit recommended SOCom share the information with
the FBI, Weldon said in an interview Tuesday.
But lawyers at either the Pentagon or SOCom determined the men were
in the country legally, Weldon said. He said he based his
information on intelligence sources.
When members of Able Danger made their presentation at command
headquarters at MacDill Air Force Base, Weldon said, the legal team
"put stickies on the faces of Mohammed Atta on the chart," to
reinforce that he was off-limits.
"They said, "You can't talk to Atta because he's here on a green
card,"...
... A former spokesman for the Sept. 11 Commission said that
members of its staff were told about the program but that the
briefers did not mention Atta's name. The commission report
produced last year did not mention Able Danger's findings.
On Tuesday, commission co-chairman Lee Hamilton said that Weldon's
information, which the congressman said came from multiple
intelligence sources, warrants a review.
He said he hoped the panel could issue a statement on its findings
by the end of the week.
"The 9/11 Commission did not learn of any U.S. government knowledge
prior to 9/11 of surveillance of Mohammed Atta or of his cell,"
said Hamilton, a former Democratic congressman from Indiana. "Had
we learned of it obviously it would have been a major focus of our
investigation."..."
...On Tuesday, commission co-chairman Lee Hamilton said that
Weldon's information, which the congressman said came from multiple
intelligence sources, warrants a review.
He said he hoped the panel could issue a statement on its findings
by the end of the week.
"The 9/11 Commission did not learn of any U.S. government knowledge
prior to 9/11 of surveillance of Mohammed Atta or of his cell,"
said Hamilton, a former Democratic congressman from Indiana. "Had
we learned of it obviously it would have been a major focus of our
investigation."
At least two congressional committees have begun looking into the
episode.
Rep. C.W. Bill Young, chairman of the Defense Appropriations
Subcommittee, said he, too, had asked the Pentagon for information
about the Able Danger program.
The Indian Shores Republican said that in hindsight, it was easy to
say that one thing or another could have disrupted the
hijackers.
"There should have been better sharing of information," he
said.
Young said that passage of the Patriot Act and appointment of John
Negroponte as intelligence czar, which gives one person access to
all information generated by the intelligence community, would help
resolve future problems.
"The tools weren't as good then as they are today," Young said.
Sounding agitated by what he perceived as a
missed opportunity, Weldon made a distinction between the military
lawyers and Special Operations Forces, whom he praised. Gen. Pete
Schoomaker, the Army chief of staff, was SOCom commander at the
time.
The small military unit developed the information using mostly open
sources, not classified channels, Weldon said.
Weldon revealed the Able Danger findings in a little-noticed speech
on the floor of the House in June. On Monday, Government Security
News, a biweekly publication that covers homeland security,
published a cover story on the subject, generating another article
in the New York Times.
Until now, Atta had not been identified publicly as a threat to the
United States before the terrorist attacks on Sept. 11, 2001.
According to Weldon, the military unit identified a terrorist cell
in Brooklyn, N.Y., in September 2000.
The individuals identified as members of the cell were Atta, Marwan
al-Shehhi, Khalid Almihdhar and Nawaf Alhamzi.
In late 1999 or 2000, the CIA had identified Almihdhar and Alhamzi
as terrorist members who might be involved in a terrorist
operation.
The duo arrived in Los Angeles in early 2000, but the FBI was not
warned about them until spring 2001. No efforts were made to track
them until a month before the terrorist attacks.
In the article published by Government Security News, a former
defense intelligence official who worked with Able Danger said he
alerted SOCom about the unit's findings. The publication said it
interviewed the source in Weldon's office...."
NOTE: The following postings (incl. sources) might show, how
significant it is to distinguish between "9/11 plotline" and
"military operation" of 9/11.
"Able Danger", whether it's based on half fake info or not, proves
exactly what all 9/11-patsie researchers, including me, already
wrote between 2002 and 2004.
POINT 1: The patsies are leading to the real perpetrators of
9/11!
POINT 2: They all got observed.
There are confirmed names of at least 5 informants
Whether "Able Danger" was yet another observing team, is therefore
already irrelevant but has to be investigated.
POINT 3: The final military operation was planned since 1998, many
significant developments of that year point strongly on that.
POINT 4: Whether with Clinton's active or passive knowledge (or by
deception), the Clinton admin logistically prepared or allow the
PRE 9/11 homeland security, created by ANSER and some other
important logistical tools and laws.
An anti-paranoia spin on research facts is counterproductive
IMO.
POINT 5: Hugh Shelton obviously worked close with the real
perpetrators of 9/11, because he was involved in the pre-planning
of the invasion into Afghanistan. After he "retired", some months
later, he 'fell' from a ladder...
POINT 6: The coincidental significance ("Able Danger") of the tampa
connection is also important, coz that's the air base, where they
planned the final invasion of Afghanistan (Charles Holland) and
flew out some bin laden familiy members....
POINT 7: Atta was already tracked by german intel since 1998. In
1999, german CIA officer Thomas Volz tried to hire Atta's buddy
Marmoun Darkanzali as an informant, who was close to some
fake-recruiters in europe...
POINT 8: One can be sure, that the so called 4 ringleaders had been
under
the control from the real perpetrators of 9/11 and they made sure,
that these 4 patsie leaders won't be involved into the actual
planning of 9/11 itself.
I will back up ALL points ASAP.
...to be continued...
[ Edited ]
Re: "Able Danger" vs. Curt Weldon- Propaganda Hoax or Truth?
ewing2001, Wed Aug 10 2005, 06:42PM
1) At least one of the official Mohammad Atta's was involved in
some CIA cover drug operations at Huffman Aviations. See Daniel
Hopsicker at http://www.madcowprod.com
We can conclude, that the real Atta never arrived in Boston on
Sep11th.
The Florida Atta was under control for the official "plotline" of
9/11.
2)
Infos on the 9/11 patsie Informants and observants for the
"plotline"
http://911review.org/Sept11Wiki/Informants.shtml
3)
See
http://inn.globalfreepress.com/modules/news/article.php?storyid=324
scroll to:
The 1998 pattern
By Ewing2001
4) ANSER and Homeland Security 1999
http://911review.org/Sept11Wiki/Anser.shtml
5) Hugh Shelton
http://911review.org/Sept11Wiki/Shelton,HenryH.shtml
6) Charles Holland, CENTCOM and the significance of Tampa for
Afghanistan and 9/11:
Commission in "private" meeting at CENTCOM
April 28, 2004
http://inn.globalfreepress.com/modules/news/article.php?storyid=82
7)
see
Atta contact Darkanzali arrested in Germany
http://inn.globalfreepress.com/modules/news/article.php?storyid=889
2004/10/15
8 )
see
http://inn.globalfreepress.com/modules/news/article.php?storyid=324
The lost War/terror drill ? (Chapter 6-8)
Chapter 6: The Perpetrators
[ Edited Wed Aug 10 2005, 07:17PM ]
Re: "Able Danger" vs. Curt Weldon- Propaganda Hoax or Truth?
ewing2001, Thu Aug 11 2005, 06:09PM
I had and still have a different take on this "some hijackers still
alive" argument, which btw. also reinforces the official story.
In my view, most of the 19 alleged suspects had been replaced by
"stand-ins" (plus actors), some worked for the CIA and some tricked
into informants.
According to various sources (incl. BBC) the following identities
had been still alive after 9/11:
Saeed Al-Ghamdi, Mohand Al-Shehri, Abdul Aziz Al-Omari, Salem
Al-Hazmi, Khalid Al-Mihdhar, Waleed M. Al-Shehri, Wail M.
Al-Shehri, Marwan Al-Shehhi, Said Al-Ghamdi, Ahmed Al-Nami
In my personal conclusion, based on all research, neither the
alleged 19 suspects or their still alive identities had anthing to
do with 9/11. I call it "plotline".
The reason to ship them in (inc. via infiltrated Saudi Visa
Consulates in Jeddah and elsewhere), was to work on a profile, but
some identities never existed and got fabricated by "stand-ins",
who sliced some credit cards etc...
Also, some sloppery revealed, that some alleged suspects had been
impersonated by multiple stand-ins at different places at same
time:
Hani Hanjour, Alomari, Atta ... (for others i have first to revise
from my own own older articles :)
Re: "Able Danger" vs. Curt Weldon- Propaganda Hoax or Truth?
ewing2001, Thu Aug 11 2005, 06:15PM
Here is a new claim by former 9/11 commissioner Felzenberg:
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/08/11/AR2005081100684.html
August 11, 2005
"...Felzenberg said an unidentified person working with Weldon came
forward Wednesday and described a meeting 10 days before the
panel's report was issued last July. During it, a military official
urged commission staffers to include a reference to the
intelligence on Atta in the final report.
Felzenberg said checks were made and the details of the July 12,
2004, meeting were confirmed. Previous to that, Felzenberg said it
was believed commission staffers knew about Able Danger from a
meeting with military officials in Afghanistan during which no
mention was made of Atta or the other three hijackers..."
Re: "Able Danger" vs. Curt Weldon- Propaganda Hoax or Truth?
ewing2001, Thu Aug 11 2005, 06:22PM
I also recommend a translation of an analysis from respected
correspondent and german 9/11 book author Matthias Broeckers:
http://www.writersblog.de/broeckers/
http://www.freetranslation.com/web.asp
11. August 2005
Pseudo News and old squash-hats
"...Für ein demnächst erscheinendes Buch hat der
repulikanische Kogreß-Abgeordnete Charles Weldon Mitglieder
dieser Spezialeinheit namens “Able Danger” interviewt,
die freilich anonym bleiben wollen. Das ist auch besser so, denn
die “News”, die sie kolportieren, sind ein uralter
Hut.
Wie sich bei Atta & Co. in der Hamburger Marienstrasse die
Schlapphüte quasi die Klinke in die Hand gaben, haben wir in
“Fakten, Fälschungen....” ausführlich
beschrieben, und auch, dass es sich bei ihrem Kumpel Khalid
Almidhar um einen langjährigen Bekannten der CIA handelt
– offiziell wurden die Herren natürlich alle nur
“beobachtet” und weil die diversen Dienste und
Poilzeistellen im Tiefschlaf waren und ihre Informationen nicht
austauschten, konnten sie sich über Jahre frei in den USA
bewegen und erhielten bei Bedarf stets frische Visa...."
Re: "Able Danger" vs. Curt Weldon- Propaganda Hoax or Truth?
freedomfiles, Thu Aug 11 2005, 07:30PM
Did DoD lawyers blow the chance to nab Atta?
http://www.gsnmagazine.com/aug_05/dod_lawyers.html
By Jacob Goodwin
In September 2000, one year before the Al Qaeda attacks of 9/11, a
U.S. Army military intelligence program, known as “Able
Danger,” identified a terrorist cell based in Brooklyn, NY,
one of whose members was 9/11 ringleader Mohammed Atta, and
recommended to their military superiors that the FBI be called in
to “take out that cell,” according to Rep. Curt Weldon,
a longtime Republican congressman from Pennsylvania who is
currently vice chairman of both the House Homeland Security and
House Armed Services Committees.
The recommendation to bring down that New York City cell -- in
which two other Al Qaeda terrorists were also active -- was not
pursued during the weeks leading up to the 2000 presidential
election, said Weldon. That’s because Mohammed Atta possessed
a “green card” at the time and Defense Department
lawyers did not want to recommend that the FBI go after someone
holding a green card, Weldon told his House colleagues last June 27
during a little-noticed speech, known as a “special
order,” which he delivered on the House floor.
Details of the origins and efforts of Able Danger were corroborated
in a telephone interview by GSN with a former defense intelligence
officer who said he worked closely with that program. That
intelligence officer, who spoke to GSN while sitting in Rep.
Weldon’s Capitol Hill office, requested anonymity for fear
that his current efforts to help re-start a similar
intelligence-gathering operation might be hampered if his identity
becomes known.
The intelligence officer recalled carrying documents to the offices
of Able Danger, which was being run by the Special Operations
Command, headquartered in Tampa, FL. The documents included a photo
of Mohammed Atta supplied by the U.S. Immigration and
Naturalization Service and described Atta’s relationship with
Osama bin Laden. The officer was very disappointed when lawyers
working for Special Ops decided that anyone holding a green card
had to be granted essentially the same legal protections as any
U.S. citizen. Thus, the information Able Danger had amassed about
the only terrorist cell they had located inside the United States
could not be shared with the FBI, the lawyers concluded.
“We were directed to take those 3M yellow stickers and place
them over the faces of Atta and the other terrorists and pretend
they didn’t exist,” the intelligence officer told
GSN.
DoD lawyers may also have been reluctant to suggest a bold action
by FBI agents after the bureau’s disastrous 1993 strike
against the Branch Davidian religious cult in Waco, TX, said Weldon
and the intelligence officer.
“So now, Mr. Speaker,” Weldon said on the House floor
last June, “for the first time I can tell our colleagues that
one of our agencies not only identified the New York cell of
Mohammed Atta and two of the terrorists, but actually made a
recommendation to bring the FBI in to take out that
cell.”
Weldon has developed a reputation for making bold pronouncements
and, occasionally, ruffling the feathers of some of his colleagues.
His recent non-fiction book, “Countdown to Terror,”
which draws on information from an Iranian expatriate source Weldon
has dubbed “Ali,” has drawn criticism from the CIA,
others in the intelligence community and some congressional
colleagues.
A longtime champion of firefighters and first responders, Weldon
has a particular interest in this subject because he has been
openly and actively pushing since 1999 for the establishment of an
integrated government-wide center that could consolidate, analyze
and act upon intelligence gathered by dozens of U.S. agencies,
armed services and departments.
Weldon’s proposal was based on the innovative intelligence
gathering capabilities he had witnessed at the U.S. Army’s
Information Dominance Center, based at Fort Belvoir, VA, (which was
formerly known as the Land Information Warfare Assessment Center.)
This Army center had employed data mining, profiling and data
collaboration techniques before several other intelligence
agencies, and was using such cutting edge software tools as
Starlight (developed by the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory)
and Spires.
For years, the CIA resisted the congressman’s recommendation,
Weldon told GSN in a telephone interview on August 1, claiming that
his plan to integrate dozens of discrete and classified
intelligence streams was both unworkable and unnecessary. Weldon
had dubbed his proposed organization the National Operations and
Analysis Hub, nicknamed NOAH, because the center was intended
“to protect our nation from the flood of threats,” he
explained.
Sixteen months after 9/11, such a “data fusion center,”
named the Terrorism Threat Integration Center (TTIC) was indeed
established by the Bush Administration.
At the urging of the 9/11 Commission, the TTIC has since been
restructured and renamed the National Counter Terrorism Center
(NCTC).
Weldon is pleased that steps have been taken to unify the
nation’s intelligence gathering and analysis capabilities,
now headed by a newly established Director of National
Intelligence, Joseph Negroponte, but Weldon remains concerned that
the “stovepipe” mentalities that plagued the
intelligence community in the past continue to inhibit true
information sharing between intelligence agencies.
He is also extremely frustrated by the fact that so little official
attention seems to have been paid to the intelligence failure
related to the Mohammed Atta cell in Brooklyn. Weldon contends that
few in the Bush Administration seem interested in investigating
that missed opportunity.
“If we had had that [military intelligence] system in 1999
and 2000, which the military had already developed as a prototype,
and if we had followed the lead of the military entity that
identified the Al Qaeda cell of Mohammed Atta, then perhaps, Mr.
Speaker, 9/11 would never have occurred,” Weldon said during
his special order remarks.
According to Weldon, staff members of the 9/11 Commission were
briefed on the capabilities of the Able Danger intelligence unit
within the Special Operations Command, which had been set up by
General Pete Schoomaker, who headed Special Ops at the time, on the
orders of General Hugh Shelton, then the chairman of the joint
chiefs of staff. Staffers at the 9/11 Commission staffers were also
told about the specific recommendation to break up the Mohammed
Atta cell. However, those commission staff members apparently did
not choose to brief the commission’s members on these
sensitive matters.
Weldon said he was told specifically by commission members, Tim
Roemer, a former Democratic congressman from Indiana; and John
Lehman, a former secretary of the Navy; that they had never been
briefed on the Able Danger unit within Special Ops or on the
unit’s evidence of a terrorist cell in Brooklyn.
“I personally talked with [Philip] Zelikow [executive
director of the 9/11 Commission] about this,” recalled the
intelligence officer. “For whatever bizarre reasons, he
didn’t pass on the information.”
The State Department, where Zelikow now works as a counselor to
Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, said he was traveling and
unavailable for comment.
“Why did the 9/11 Commission not investigate this entire
situation?” asked Weldon on June 27. “Why did the 9/11
Commission not ask the question about the military’s
recommendation against the Mohammed Atta cell?”
Weldon is also disappointed with himself for not pushing harder
against the intelligence bureaucracy that he saw as resisting his
proposal to set up a more integrated intelligence-gathering
operation. But he saves some of his greatest ire for the lawyers
within the Department of Defense -- he is not sure if they were
working within the Special Operations Command or higher up the
organizational chart, within the Office of the Secretary of Defense
-- for their unwillingness to allow Able Danger to send to the FBI
its evidence and its recommendation for immediate action.
“Obviously, if we had taken out that cell, 9/11 would not
have occurred and, certainly, taking out those three principal
players in that cell would have severely crippled, if not totally
stopped, the operation that killed 3,000 people in America,”
said Weldon.
Shining a spotlight on this intelligence gaffe has not been easy.
Russ Caso, Weldon’s chief of staff, explained to GSN the
steps his boss has taken to shed light on the situation.
Weldon spoke with Rep. Pete Hoekstra (R-MI), the chairman of the
House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, about
conversations he has had with several members of the Able Danger
intelligence unit. Weldon has urged Hoekstra to investigate the
reasons why Able Danger’s revelations were not shared with
the FBI. Hoekstra looked into the matter at the Pentagon, but after
several days of fruitless inquiries, was unable to find anyone at
the Defense Department who seemed to know anything about Able
Danger or would acknowledge the intelligence unit had ever existed,
explained Caso in a telephone interview with GSN.
Unwilling to let the matter drop, Weldon arranged for a
face-to-face meeting in late July between Hoekstra, himself and the
former intelligence officer who had worked with Able Danger, and
who outlined his former unit’s evidence and recommendations
for Hoekstra.
“Congressman Weldon has met with several people who were
working on Able Danger to identify where Al Qaeda was set up around
the world,” said Caso. “They made the suggestion that
this information be passed to the FBI, and lawyers within the
Defense Department -- whether within Special Ops or within OSD, we
don’t know -- and the lawyers said,
‘No’.”
A report about some of these events appeared last June 19 in The
Times Herald newspaper, of Norristown, PA, which is located in the
Philadelphia suburbs that Rep. Weldon represents in Congress.
Re: "Able Danger" vs. Curt Weldon- Propaganda Hoax or Truth?
freedomfiles, Thu Aug 11 2005, 07:35PM
Curt Weldon is a hardline neo-conservative who doesn't shun strange
tactics to spread disinformation :
Curt Weldon's Deep Throat
http://www.prospect.org/web/page.ww?section=root&name=ViewWeb&articleId=9836
The Pennsylvania Republican’s freelance spying has once again
brought a discredited arms dealer's fabrications to the CIA.
By Laura Rozen
Web Exclusive: 06.10.05
Print Friendly | Email Article
Countdown to Terror, Representative Curt Weldon's sensationalistic
new book about his personal struggle to combat the Iranian
terrorism threat despite the alleged resistance of the CIA, is
based entirely on the Pennsylvania Republican's freelance
communications with a secret source he code-named "Ali." Much of
Weldon's book, which will be released next week by Regnery
Publishing, consists of reproduced pages of comically overwrought
"intelligence" memos faxed from the Iranian
émigré’s Paris location to Weldon’s
office between 2003 and 2004.
“Dear Curt,” reads one memo excerpt from
“Ali” published by Weldon. “An attack against an
atomic plant by a plane, the name mentioned, but not clear it
begins with ‘SEA’ … [Seattle?].” Another
reads: “Dear Curt: … I confirm again a terrorist
attack within the United States is planned before the American
elections."
But in an exclusive interview with The American Prospect, Weldon's
"Ali" -- who was identified in an April article by me and Jeet Heer
as Fereidoun Mahdavi, a frail, elderly former minister of commerce
in the shah’s government and a longtime business associate of
Iran-Contra arms dealer Manucher Ghorbanifar -- said he was stunned
and perplexed to learn that Weldon had used his information to
write a book, emphasizing that Weldon never even told him about the
book.
Mahdavi also said that the bulk of the information that he had
provided to Weldon was originally sourced from none other than
Ghorbanifar, the subject of a rare CIA “burn notice”
after the agency found him to be a "fabricator" more than two
decades ago during the Iran-Contra affair.
“Many information that I have given to Weldon is coming from
Ghorbanifar,” said Mahdavi, who was reached in Paris by
telephone on June 6. “Because Ghorbanifar used me, in fact,
to pass that stuff because I know he has problems in
Washington.”
The former minister continued: “I am well-known in Tehran.
How can I call Tehran? But Ghorbanifar is something else. He has
all the contacts within Iran. Nobody has so many information and
contacts that he has. Now if he is using that information through
me to try to buy power indirectly, that is his business. I do it
because I have known him for many years.”
Several Iranian exile associates of the pair have told the Prospect
that Mahdavi, living in reduced circumstances and caring for his
cancer-stricken wife, is in fact financially dependent on
Ghorbanifar. They have been involved in various businesses
together, from petroleum shipping to arms dealing to (more
recently) intelligence peddling, since both washed up in Paris
after the Iranian revolution in 1979.
Although Mahdavi expresses understanding of the motives of his old
pal and business partner Ghorbanifar, he says he is utterly baffled
by Weldon’s decision to use his information as the foundation
of a book that the congressman never once mentioned to him.
“I assume that if [Weldon] wanted to publish a book, I assure
you I would have heard it,” Mahdavi said initially, in
disbelief that Weldon would publish the book without even a phone
call. “I am just surprised that you tell me he has a book
coming out … .”
Hours later, after receiving a fax with a Congressional Quarterly
article about Weldon’s forthcoming book and the amazon.com
book description, Mahdavi spoke again in shock and anger.
“Someone is using me for their purposes,” he raged.
“How is it possible that something like that book comes out
and the people who publish it don’t inform me? Don’t
you think that’s strange? What I cannot understand is, if you
had not called me and told me there is a book coming out from
Weldon, I would have never known about it. You informed me. But
this is now, I am sure, there is a fight between all these [U.S.
government] organizations, and they are using this issue and using
me.”
Among those who agree is the former senior CIA official who met
with Mahdavi in response to Weldon’s pressure on the agency
to accept the Mahdavi/Ghorbanifar information. The tale of "Ali"
suggests that the agency is assiduously seeking to weed out another
fabricator like Ghorbanifar (or Iraqi fabulist Ahmad Chalabi) from
corrupting U.S. intelligence information on Iran.
Bill Murray, a former CIA station chief in Paris, met with me on
June 9 at a northern Virginia shopping mall to talk about Weldon's
assault on the agency. Still doing contract work for the CIA since
his recent retirement, Murray chose to speak up about the
agency’s role in vetting and determining
“Ali’s” information to be fabrications --
“émigré babble" -- because Weldon has publicly
savaged the CIA in his book. By speaking with reporters, Murray
believes he could be risking his contract work, but he’s
outraged over what he considers disingenuous attacks by the
Pennsylvania congressman.
“Someone’s got to stand up,” Murray said.
“I spent 35 years doing this job, mainly in the Middle East.
My guideline is well-sourced intelligence to help shape policy.
That’s what I did; that’s what my people did. That is
my standard, the integrity standard. And this man [Weldon] is
attacking our integrity. And I’m not going to sit back and
ignore it.”
Indeed, Murray describes very extensive personal efforts to
ascertain the quality of Mahdavi's information, including four
meetings and many phone conversations, as well as the creation of a
secure phone line for Mahdavi to transmit his material to the U.S.
government. (As the chief of station at the U.S. Embassy, Murray
would normally have sent a junior officer to meet with a potential
source like Mahdavi; instead, Murray went himself.)
According to Murray, Mahdavi only sent two faxes on the secure line
-- one with all the information he had already sent Weldon and
Michael Ledeen, the neoconservative scholar and longtime
Ghorbanifar champion, and another with a plan to overthrow the
mullahs in Tehran. Murray says he firmly told Mahdavi that he was
not willing to receive such plans, because overthrowing the Iranian
government is not U.S. policy.
He also said that during those meetings and calls, several things
became clear rather quickly about Weldon's informant.
“Mahdavi works for Ghorbanifar,” said Murray, noting
that the agency still forbids its employees from dealing with the
colorful, fast-talking arms dealer. “The two are inseparable.
Ghorbanifar put Mahdavi out to meet with Weldon … .
Ghorbanifar decided to have a cutout.” When Mahdavi
consistently refused to provide any information to verify the
credibility of his sources or their increasingly outlandish
allegations, Murray determined that the information was a mix of
fabrications, babble, and useless political analysis.
“I don’t feed sensationalistic garbage to American
political leaders,” Murray said, “without some reason
to believe that it is well-sourced or true. . . My generation is
not risk-averse. We are just averse to feeding garbage into the
system.”
“This man [Mahdavi] never said a single thing that you could
look back later and he said it would happen and it did
happen,” the retired station chief continued. “He
refused to give me any information that would indicate he actually
had access to people in Iran who had access to that
information.”
Murray also indicated that Mahdavi repeatedly requested U.S.
government payment of approximately $150,000 so that he could pay
his debts in Iran and help institute political changes there.
Despite Weldon's constant urgings, the CIA was unwilling to provide
any such payment.
Moreover, said Murray, Weldon himself violated U.S. government
protocol by failing to report his encounters with Mahdavi in France
to the U.S. ambassador when asked whether he planned any meetings
there while being hosted by the embassy in April 2004. According to
Murray, Weldon denied he had planned any meetings -- and then
proceeded to meet with both Mahdavi and Ghorbanifar, the subject of
the CIA burn notice, at the Sofitel hotel around the corner from
the U.S. Embassy.
Murray added that Weldon now plans to have his new book translated
into Farsi and smuggled into Iran, as well as having it broadcast
into Iran on the Los Angeles-based Iranian diaspora radio
stations.
This curious behavior raises questions about Weldon’s
motives. Is he a naïf getting taken in by two geopolitical
hucksters? Or is his treatment of Mahdavi a kind of political
opportunism all its own?
Apparently Weldon has treated his allies as poorly as his new
enemies at the CIA. In March, his spokesman told the Prospect that
Weldon’s book was being co-written by a former CIA analyst
and longtime Weldon congressional staffer named Peter Vincent Pry.
Indeed, Pry is the named recipient of several of the Mahdavi memos
published in Weldon’s book, and Mahdavi acknowledges meeting
with Pry and Weldon.
But when copies of Weldon’s book appeared this week,
Pry’s name was nowhere to be found in the author credits.
Meanwhile another book on Iran and terrorism by Kenneth Timmerman,
a right-leaning journalist long interested in Mideast affairs, is
due to be published by Crown next week as Countdown to Crisis, a
title almost identical to that of Weldon’s book. Timmerman
told the Prospect that Regnery changed Weldon’s title to
imitate Timmerman’s after publicity materials about the
Timmerman book appeared on Crown’s Web site.
So much for squabbling among right-wing authors.
What’s far more important, says Murray, is that
Weldon’s freelance 007 crusade to be his own spymaster has
ultimately done a disservice to the American people and to national
security.
“Most of us [CIA officers] have been consumed with preventing
real terrorist threats to the U.S. for the past four years,”
he said with a fierce squint. “And virtually everything
Ghorbanifar and his people come up with diverts us. I have
hard-working people working for me, and they don’t have time
for this bullshit.”
Laura Rozen reports on national-security and foreign-policy issues
from Washington, D.C., for The American Prospect, The Nation, and
other publications. Her first article on Ghorbanifar and Mahdavi,
“The Front,” co-authored with Jeet Heer, appeared in
the Prospect’s April edition.
Curt Weldon's new book warns of Iran
Weldon Accuses CIA, Colleagues of Ignoring Secret Information
By Dana Priest, Washington Post Staff Writer
Thursday, June 9, 2005; Page A08
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/06/08/AR2005060802341.html
NBC News
Guests: Sen. Joe Biden, Rep. Curt Weldon, David Broder, John
Harwood, Gwen Ifill, Judy Woodruff
Updated: 11:10 a.m. ET June 12, 2005
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/8130648/
WikiPedia: Curt Weldon
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Curt_Weldon
WikiPedia: Manucher Ghorbanifar
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Manucher_Ghorbanifar
[ Edited Thu Aug 11 2005, 08:08PM
]
Re: "Able Danger" vs. Curt Weldon- Propaganda Hoax or Truth?
ewing2001, Thu Aug 11 2005, 07:38PM
NOTE: We're talking here about the "plotline"
identities!!
Sources from "Tracking all hijackers"
by ewing2001
http://www.scoop.co.nz/stories/HL0302/S00218.htm
28 February 2003
1)
Mohammad Atta
("observed" since at least 1997, confirmed 1999, by BND,
CIA, Mossad and various european police and
intelligence)
"...Mohammad Atta's telephone calls between him and
another suspect, Imad Eddin Barakat Yarbas, were being
intercepted. Yarbas is otherwise known as 'Abu Dahdah',
a Palestinian with Spanish citizenship and connections
with Bin Laden associates.
Yarbas' phone was tapped since 1997. As later came out,
not only the Spanish police, but also Spanish
intelligence okayed the bugs..."
2)
Marwan Al-Shehhi
(observed together with Mohammad Atta since at least
1998/99, CIA, FBI)
3)
Ziad Jarrah
(observed together with Mohammad Atta)
The CIA still claims, that Jarrah (pilot of the jetliner
that crashed in Pennsylvania) was not on a terrorist
watch list. However, according to motel records, a man
by that name used a credit card to pay for a late August
2001 stay at the Pin Del motel in Laurel, Md., where
Nawaq Alhamzi stayed in September.
Alhamzi was on the CIA watch list.
http://www.wbz.com/now/story/0,1597,311329-364,00.shtml
Therefore it can be assumed, that Jarrah was observed as
well.
Another important detail: Ziad Jarrah's uncle Nazem
Jarrah, worked for the East Germany intelligence
service, in addition to being an agent for the Libyan
services.
4)
Hani Hanjour
Hani Hanjour had been on a watch list since 1996. Due to
information from a former muhjahadeen fighter of the CIA
and former informant of the FBI, Aukai Collins, Hanjour
had been observed by the FBI since 1996.
5-8)
Waleed M. Alshehri
Saeed Alghamdi
Ahmed Alghamdi
Ahmed Alhaznawi
Tracked via military institutions, i.e.
Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University in Daytona Beach
San Antonio Base at the Alpha Tango Air schools
Naval Air Station in Pensacola, Florida
9)
Salem Alhamzi
Salem Alhamzi was being observed by the CIA and FBI,
together with Khalid Al-Midhar, at this time. This
became one of the most well publicized stories, but it
is still blamed on just "incompetence".
http://www.cnn.com/2001/US/09/16/inv.investigation.terrorism/
10)
Khalid Al-Midhar
It has already been confirmed that Khalid Al-Midhar was
observed by the CIA and FBI, and lived in Jersey City,
New Jersey.
http://www.cnn.com/2001/US/09/16/inv.investigation.terrorism
11)
Nawaq Alhamzi
Tracked via connected saudi intel (Prince Turki al
Faisal ) and Saudi Ministry of Defense and Aviation
12)
Abdulaziz Alomari
One of the few multiple personalities, most obvious
impostered more than once.
One of his identities possibly tracked at Newark Airport
and Saudi Flight Ops.
13)
Majed Moqed
Moqued "stayed" in Caldwell, New Jersey.
Possibly impersonated or did not exiist, but profiled by
someone of McGuire Air Force Base (305 Air Mobility
Wing) in Fort Lee
14)
Satam Al Suqami
Lowest Profile. However, it was HIS passport (not Attas!) which
was
"found" in front of the former CIA office at WTC 7,
Vesey street, which appears to me, that his identity was
scripted from some neocon-cell inside the CIA as well.
15)
Wail Alshehri
His visa mentioned "wasantwn" (washington) as his
alleged employer. Possibly scripted identity by a
stand-in
16 -19)
Fayez Ahmed
Hamza Alghamdi
Mohald Alshehri
Ahmed Alnami
4 more scripted indentities, 2 of them at least already
confirmed as being still alive.
20)
Zacarias Moussaoui
(observed by FBI)
Lived 3 minutes away from David Boren (ex-CIA George
Tenet's mentor) in Norman, Oklahoma
Two "Hijackers" too much
21, 22)
Ayub Ali Khan aka Gul Mohammed Shah
Mohammed Jaweed Azmath
Most obviously tracked by FBI, then later also by DIA
A bizarre screw-up.
2 alleged hijackers (maybe scripted for another hijacked
plane) got arrested and jailed for 1 year.
http://globalfreepress.com/article.pl?sid=03/12/21/2043235
"...In an exclusive report and interview with Village
Voice from October 2002, other fishy details of former
"evidence" were revealed:
"The hair dye was due to vanity (Azmath sported
close-cropped, graying hair in court), the box cutters
were tools of the men's newsstand trade" (Penn Station,
New Jersey, sold in August 2001), and "the cash was for
moving to Texas to find better-paying jobs." (to open a
fruit stand) ...
...In the same article, Azmath announced to sue the US
Government "for alleged physical and mental torture".
The lawsuit never took place..."
The theory about 19 alleged "hijackers" and more is a
myth.
The scripted "plotline" has nothing to do with the
military operation of 9/11, which has been
misinterpreted by a majority of 9/11 researchers.
Please also check out the role of dutch intelligence at:
The dutch 9/11 ties -from Eindhoven to the Magic Dutch Boys in
Venice, FL
http://www.globalfreepress.com/article.pl?sid=03/09/04/081209&mode=thread
plus
Mohammed Atta - Slips Under Radar of 6 Countries?
http://tinyurl.com/c2yb
The 9/11 NSA connection:
At least six alleged 9/11 hijackers, including all of those who
officially boarded Flight 77, lived in Laurel, Maryland, close to
NSA.
They reportedly include Hani Hanjour, Majed Moqed, Khalid
Almihdhar, Nawaf Alhazmi, and Salem Alhazmi.
The NSA confirmed, that they had been aware of a
“Khalid,” “Nawaf Alhazmi,” and his brother
“Salem” having communications with this safe house in
1999 and earlier in 1998. In summer 2000 there are additional
communications to the safe house from “Khalid” and
“Salem”.
Actually it was also the NSA, who passed information to the CIA
about the famous meeting in Malaysia.
http://election.cbsnews.com/stories/2001/01/24/60II/main266857.shtml
Like CIA and FBI, NSA also is using "negligence" as a cover for a
controlled observation of a combination of pseudo-patsies,
stand-ins, "phantoms" and other scripted personalities.
In at least one german paper, DIE ZEIT, it was confirmed, that also
MOSSAD supported the so called "observations", apparently also with
the help of an alleged art students group, as reported by FOX
TV:
Aug. 23, 2001.
"...The Israeli intelligence service Mossad presents to its
American counterpart a list of names of terrorists who are living
in the United States and seem to be planning to carry out an attack
in the near future. According to documents obtained by DIE ZEIT,
Mossad agents in the United States were following at least four of
the 19 hijackers, including Almihdhar..."
[ Edited Thu Aug 11 2005, 07:51PM ]
Re: "Able Danger" vs. Curt Weldon- Propaganda Hoax or Truth?
ewing2001, Sat Aug 13 2005, 05:01PM
...Yesterday, Thomas H. Kean and Lee H. Hamilton, former Chair and
Vice Chair of the 9/11 panel released the following statement, in
which they claimed, that Philip Zelikow, the former executive
director of the 9/11 Commission, was aware of "Able Danger" since
October 21, 2003. The statement also reinforces the official story
of 9/11.
However, please also note, that the former 9/11 panelists try to
downplay the existence of ABLE DANGER. This comes as a surprise,
because they're usually playing the bigger negligence card.
The Commission did not mention ABLE DANGER in its report. The name
and character of this classified operation had not, at that time,
been publicly disclosed. The operation itself did not turn out to
be historically significant
The statement was forwarded to some mailing lists of 9/11 family
members.
I couldn't find it at http://www.9-11pdp.org/press/index.htm
yet.
August 12, 2005
Kean-Hamilton Statement on ABLE DANGER
"...On October 21, 2003, Philip Zelikow, the executive director of
the 9/11 Commission, two senior Commission staff members, and a
representative of the executive branch, met at Bagram Base,
Afghanistan, with three individuals doing intelligence work for the
Department of Defense. One of the men, in recounting information
about al Qaeda's activities in Afghanistan before 9/11, referred to
a DOD program known as ABLE DANGER. He said this program was now
closed, but urged Commission staff to get the files on this program
and review them, as he thought the Commission would find
information about al Qaeda and Bin Ladin that had been developed
before the 9/11 attack. He also complained that Congress,
particularly the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence
(HPSCI), had effectively ended a human intelligence network he
considered valuable.
As with their other meetings, Commission staff promptly prepared a
memorandum for the record. That memorandum, prepared at the time,
does not record any mention of Mohamed Atta or any of the other
future hijackers, or any suggestion that their identities were
known to anyone at DOD before 9/11. Nor do any of the three
Commission staffers who participated in the interview, or the
executive branch lawyer, recall hearing any such allegation.
While still in Afghanistan, Dr. Zelikow called back to the
Commission headquarters in Washington and requested that staff
immediately draft a document request seeking information from DOD
on ABLE DANGER. The staff had also heard about ABLE DANGER in
another context, related to broader military planning involving
possible operations against al Qaeda before 9/11.
In November 2003, shortly after the staff delegation had returned
to the United States, two document requests related to ABLE DANGER
were finalized and sent to DOD. One, sent on November 6, asked,
among other things, for any planning order or analogous documents
about military operations related to al Qaeda and Afghanistan
issued from the beginning of 1998 to September 20, 2001, and any
reports, memoranda, or briefings by or for either the Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff or the Commanding General of the U.S.
Special Operations Command in connection with such planning,
specifically including material related to ABLE DANGER. The other,
sent on November 25, treated ABLE DANGER as a possible intelligence
program and asked for all documents and files associated with DIA's
program 'ABLE DANGERâ'? from the beginning of 1998 through
September 20, 2001.
In February 2004, DOD provided documents responding to these
requests. Some were turned over to the Commission and remain in
Commission files. Others were available for staff review in a DOD
reading room. Commission staff reviewed the documents. Four former
staff members have again, this week, reviewed those documents
turned over to the Commission, which are held in the Commission's
archived files. Staff who reviewed the documents held in the DOD
reading room made notes summarizing each of them. Those notes are
also in the Commission archives and have also been reviewed this
week.
The records discuss a set of plans, beginning in 1999, for ABLE
DANGER, which involved expanding knowledge about the al Qaeda
network. Some documents include diagrams of terrorist networks.
None of the documents turned over to the Commission mention Mohamed
Atta or any of the other future hijackers. Nor do any of the staff
notes on documents reviewed in the DOD reading room indicate that
Mohamed Atta or any of the other future hijackers were mentioned in
any of those documents.
A senior staff member also made verbal inquiries to the HPSCI and
CIA staff for any information regarding the ABLE DANGER operation.
Neither organization produced any documents about the operation, or
displayed any knowledge of it.
Able Danger part 4
Able Danger part 5
related
Operation Able Danger 9/11 review
Cong. Curt Weldon to probe top-secret 9-11 Cambone notes?
Rebuttal to the IG's Able Danger Report
DoD - 9/11 EncyclopediaANSER Institute for Homeland Security
Anser - 9/11Encyclopedia